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Light Traffic Lines and Railway Abandonment
It has long been evident that a substantial mileage of the railway network
of the country carries only relatively light traffic. A primary manifestation
has been application for abandonment; in the period from 1970 through 1975,
for example, a total of 10,580 miles was approved for abandonment, and as of
May 1976, there were applications outstanding for 6050 miles. Line mileage
fell from 249,000 in 1929 to 200,000 in 1975, despite some construction. Part
of the abandoned mileage was obviously redundant ( for- example , there were
once three railroads to Goldfield, Nevada) , while others left communities with-
out rail service. But the actual abandonment figure was only the surface of
the iceberg. Many railroads were notoriously slow to weed out branch lines,
either through neglect, desire to avoid adverse shipper reaction, fear of re-
jection by the ICC, or the costs of the procedure. The problem was suddenly
brought to popular and legislative concern by several events: the collapse
of the Penn Central and the subsequent investigation into the cause and plans
for restructuring, and the increased deterioration of many light traffic lines,
to the point that continued operation became virtually impossible. Subsequently,
the stress placed upon abandonment of light traffic lines in the DOT and USRA
plans for restructuring the northeast railroads heightened interest in the
question and led to a sharp dispute between DOT and USRA on the one hand and
the Rail Services Planning Office of the Interstate Commerce Commission, shipper
and community groups, and state agencies on the other.
As a consequence of this interest, various research activities have been
undertaken, some under government sponsorship, some at universities and under
state government support. It is the purpose of this paper to summarize certain aspects
of this work, with stress on that undertaken at the University of Illinois, Urban*
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The Viability of Light Traffic Lines
One of the most significant aspects of the research has been the attempt
to ascertain the volume of traffic necessary for a light traffic line to be
(1) viable from a profit standpoint, without subsidy, and (2) economically
viable.
The first systematic study of this type was undertaken by the firm of
1
R. L. Banks and Associates for the Federal Railroad Administration. A sample
of 100 light traffic lines (branches and independent roads) was selected, and
an attempt made to establish a formula to determine viability of such lines
according to density of traffic and length. Revenues appropriately attributable
to the line and costs attributable to each line were ascertained, to determine
profitability. The results showed the estimated figure of the volume of traffic
necessary for roads in each of the regions to break even; in addition to the
basic figures, upper and lower probability ranges were ascertained on a 90%
basis. Typical figures for the Eastern region are shown below:
Cars Originated or Terminated per Year
Length of Line, Miles Upper Criter ion Breakeven Lower Criterion
5 477 308 139
10 734 565 396
25 1,559 1,231 903
35 2,018 1,690 1,362
This served as the basis for the determination in DOT's preliminary plan
of lines to be included in the restructured system, but including only traffic
to and from points originating or terminating more than 75 cars a year, using
the upper criterion.
Development and Evaluation of an Economic Abstraction of Light Density Rai l Lines,
a report for the Federal Railroad Administration {Washington: 1975).
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For determining the lower limit of traffic below which subsidy should not
be considered, based upon an estimate of relative rail and motor costs for
different levels of traffic, DOT used the following figures:
Miles Ton miles per mile per year
5 9,100
10 14,300
20 23,400
30 37,300
The USRA preliminary and final plans avoided the use of a general formula,
and sought to ascertain the revenues and expenses attributable to each line
.
This is of course a formidable task involving some very arbitrary assumptions.
It did lead to a considerably smaller mileage to be abandoned - but still sub-
stantial - in the northeast. The detailed studies of individual lines in the
evaluations by the Rail Services Planning Office of DOT - along with the protests -
provide a very enlightening picture of branch line railroad operation in the U . S
.
The 1976 DOT study of light traffic lines used a figure of 70 cars originating
1
or terminating per mile to indicate potentially excess lines.
Three Studies on Class II Railroad Cost Functions
To throw additional light on this question, three studies were made at
Illinois of Class II railroad cost functions. While not all such roads are
light traffic lines, most are. To determine long run cost functions, two
2
samples were used. The first included 209 Class II railroads for the year 1968,
the last year for which the ICC published data of these roads. The second was
a sample of 44 Class II roads, using 1973 data from the reports filed with the
ICC. The first sample included all Class II roads except those not typical
of short line freight carriers; the second group was partly selected at
Railroad Abandonments and Alternatives (Washington: U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, 1976)
.
2
Sidhu, N.D., Charney, A., and Due, J.F., "Cost Functions For Class II Railroads —
1968 and 1973", College of Commerce Working Paper #262, University of Illinois,
Urbana, 1975.
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random/ partly typical Class II roads in two length groups. Distance (mileage,
for 1968, average haul for 1973) and volume (net ton miles) were the independent
variables. Regression analysis was employed. The results show that the two
principal cost items, maintenance of way and transportation (train operating
costs) are influenced substantially by volume but not by distance; only main-
tenance of equipment and traffic and administrative costs are affected signifi-
cantly by distance. The major conclusions, illustrated on Figs. 1 and 2, are
as follows (based primarily on the 1973 study)
:
1. There are substantial economies of scale, but these are primarily
exhausted at a relatively low volume figure, compared to main lines - most
by 140,000 net ton miles per mile - whereas studies by Harris, Keeler and others
suggest 500,000 ton miles for Class I carriers.
2. Roads with traffic under 30,000 tm/m have costs in excess of 40C a ton
mile, with a median of 51C, a high of 75<?, and a low of 27C.
3. All roads with traffic under 55,000 tm/m had costs in excess of 25 cents
per ton mile with one exception; but no roads with volume over this figure
(and hauls over 7 miles) had costs per tm/m in excess of 18 cents, and 20 of 31
had costs under 10 cents. No roads over 200,000 tm/m with one exception had costs
in excess of 7£ per ton mile (the median was 5.2), and 2 over 800,000 tm/m had
costs under 2 1/2 cents
.
From the 1973 study tables were developed showing the length of haul on
the main line necessary for a short line to be economically viable, as shown
in Table I . With the assumption of truck costs of 4 cents per ton mile and
short line costs of 13 cents per ton mile, for example, the main line haul
would need to be 55 miles if the branch was only 5 miles, 275 miles if it
were 50 miles. But with short line costs of 26 cents (traffic in the range
fram 35,000 to 50,000 tm/m), a short line of 10 miles would require a 240
mile main line haul, of 100 miles, 2400. These figures are subject to the
constraint that that transfer from truck to rail at the junction point may be
Harris, R.G., An Empirical and Institutional Analysis of Excess Capacity in the Rail
Freight Industry ; Keeler, T.E., On the Economic Impact of Railroad Freight Regulation;
Dept. of Economics, U. of California, Working Papers No. SL-7602 and SL-7601, 1976.
!
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cheaper. If this is taken into consideration, with, for example, 13 cents
per ton mile on the branch line and $1.50 per ton costs of transfer, transfer
to truck would be more advantageous if 'he branch exceeds 17 miles in length.
But if the branch line has traffic in excess of 800,000 ton miles per mile -
about 60 cars a day - its cost are as low as truck costs under the most
favorable trucking circumstances. With trucking costs of 4 cents per mile the
line is viable at 400,000 tons, or 30 cars a day - with no main line haul at
all.
Further study was made of the elasticity of the cost items of the median
road. All cost items have elasticity less than 1; the highest is with track
maintenance (. 57 ) , substantially above train operating cost (.20). The overall
figure for operating costs is .24, for all costs, including return on salvage
value, .25.
Table 1
Length of Main Line Haul Necessary For
Class II Railroads to be Economically Viable
Length of Main Line Haul Necessary to Make
Length of Class II Road Economically Justifiable
Class II
Road
5
10
25
50
100
C
2
= 2* C
2
= 40 C
2
= 6.5* C
2
= 13« C
2
= 26t
10 22.5 55 120
20 45 110 240*
50 112.5 275* 600*
100 225 550* 1,200*
200 450 1,100* 2,200*
Indicates that transfer from rail to truck is cheaper, as explained below.

Short Run Cost Functions
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1
A study was also made of short run costs functions of Class II railroads,
to determine the ability to adjust costs to changes in traffic volume in a
short period of time. Of necessity a small sample was used to make the task
manageable: ten roads, ones known to be typical light traffic freight-only
roads, were selected for the period 1963 through 1973. It was necessary to
deflate the various cost items to adjust for inflation. Regression analysis
was employed to isolate the effects of distance and volume upon the costs
.
Actually, distance was found to have little or no effect on most of the variables.
So far as volume was concerned, the elasticity of the reaction of total cost
to changes in volume was very low - less than .3 for six of the ten roads.
The other four had a much higher figure - .6 - attributable almost entirely to
maintenance of way, suggesting that as volume increases and more funds are
available, maintenance of way expenditure is increased drastically. Equip-
ment rental for a number of the roads also had a high elasticity, as would be
expected. On the whole, the figures show a high degree of excess capacity and
thus substantial gains from greater traffic volume - a conclusion similar to
the long run results except that the LRAC curve flattens at a lower level of
output, showing these firms can adjust factors more satisfactorily to output
over time than in a short run period, as would be expected.
In other words, virtually any short line road will benefit substantially
from an increase in the volume of traffic - except for a short period when
sharp increases in maintenance of way expenditure is necessary. Equally the road
will suffer from a decline. But over time, as indicated above, there is a
greater degree of adjustment of factor inputs to volume of traffic.
Charney, A.H., Sidhu, N.D., Due, J.F., "Short Run Cost Functions for Class II Rail-
roads", College of Commerce Working Paper #321, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1976.
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A Comparison of Samples of Abandoned and Surviving Roads
In another study, a sample of 30 Class II railroads that had been abandoned
in the last three decades was selected, analysed for the influences on the
abandonment decisions, and various data of this group compared with those of
a sample of 28 of the lowest-volume Class II roads that had continued to operate
down through 1975. The abandoned-lines sample was selected partly at random,
partly of roads known to be typical of the group. This did not involve econo-
metric analysis, but merely a comparison of various sets of data for the two
groups of roads. Table 2 shows the distribution of the two sets by volume:
Table 2
Distribution of Abandoned and Surviving Lines by Volume
Net Ton Miles
Per Mile* Abandoned Surviving
000s Lines Lines
Under 6 6
6-10 1 2
11 - 20 7 7
21 - 35 7 11
36 - 68 5 5
69 - 100 2 -
Over 100 2 -
Total 30 25**
Average for fifteen years prior to abandonment or prior to 1969.
**Three roads had averaged over 68,000 tm/m in the 15 year period
but not in the last 3 years of the period.
The major conclusions are as follows:
1. A number of lines have continued to operate for long periods with
less traffic than is regarded as necessary for a branch line of a major system.
Due, J.F., "Influences Affecting the Abandonment of Class II Railroads", College
of Commerce Working Paper #298, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1976.
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2. Survival with traffic under 10,000 tm/m - 1 or 2 cars a day - is
virtually impossible unless the line is extremely short. A line is barely
marginal at less, than 20,000 tm/m. s
3. A line with traffic over 65,000 tm/m and typical costs and rates has
an excellent chance of being viable, and one over 100,000 very definitely
so, except under unusual circumstances. These amount to roughly 9 and 16
loaded freight cars per train, 3 times a week operation.
4. Lines between 20,000 and 65,000 tm/m may or may not be able to survive
for long periods. The majority of the roads in both samples are in this
group. One determinant is the type of commodity and thus the rate; but the
most significant is the mileage of the line; this is demonstrated clearly in
Table 3 below. No line with traffic under 65,000 tm/m has been able to
survive if it exceeds 50 miles in length, and very few in excess of 25.
Table 3
Mileage Distribution of Abandoned and Surviving Lines
Abandoned Surviving
Miles Lines Lines
5 and under 2 6
6-12 5 9
13 - 25 9 11
26 - 50 9 2
51 - 75 1
76 - 100 1
Over 100 3
5. The evidence suggests that a light traffic line must replace about
100 ties per mile annually - 5% of the total - if it is to continue to operate.
Tie replacement is usually, but not always, curtailed drastically for several
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years before abandonment.
6. Typically abandonment does not take place until deficits in net
revenue from railway operations have coi. cinued for a number of years. Operations
continue far beyond the point which profit optimal ity, with reasonable expecta-
tions, dictates.
7. In a number of cases, abandonment occurred either because of physical
damage to line or equipment, or to loss of a major shipper. But the underlying
causes were typically decline in forest products output, decline in mining,
and loss of traffic to trucks, especially when the volume was low to begin with.
8. Relatively few communities of any size were left without service
because of abandonment, but there were several instances. More communities
declined in population after abandonment than gained, but many of the former
were losing population before abandonment.
9. While there were protests in a majority of cases, these were severe
in only eight. While no careful examination of indirect benefits was attempted
in the study, the analysis suggests that five of the thirty lines could pro-
bably have been justifiably retained, considering indirect benefits, two because
of actual and potential industrial traffic, two because of possible future
coal developments, one because it left a large region with potential mining
development without rail service.
Alternatives
While most studies consider the question of alternatives to operation of
light traffic lines by major railroad systems, two concentrated on this question:
1. Short Line Operation
A study by the Banks firm compared in depth the operation of 6 short line
railroads with 6 similar branches of major systems in the same area, with similar
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characteristics. The conclusions reached are as follows:
1. Short lines offer no magic formula; the more prosperous ones would
be profitable branches, and many branches of Class I roads could not subsist
as short lines. ,
2. There are, however, certain net advantages. The local line
manager can maintain closer relations with shippers, difficult for a major
road to duplicate.
3. The greatest savings are in labor costs: the payment of wages
on local wage scales instead of nationally negotiated ones based primarily
on metropolitan area wages, and much greater flexibility in the use of labor
than union contracts permit the major systems.
On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages with regard to equip-
ment repair, use of diesels, and specialized maintenance of way equipment.
. 2
A study of various alternatives prepared for the State of Wisconsin
revealed another difficulty: in contrast to past attitudes, several of the
Class I railroads today are very unsympathetic to transfer of branches to
local firms in lieu of abandonment.
2. Municipal Operation
3
An indepth study was made of three municipal railroads. The City of Prine-
ville, in central Oregon, has been a highly successfxil operation, after difficult
early years. Built in 1919 and operated by the city throughout, it has enabled
Prineville to become a major lumber and milling center, which it could not
Short Line Techniques to Improve Financial Viability of Light Density Lines -
Major Railroads , A Report to the Federal Railroad Administration (Washington:
R. L. 3anks and Associates, 1974)
.
2Short Line Railroad Operations as an Alternative to Loss of Rail Service : Pros
and Cons , based on a report prepared by John F. Due for the Wisconsin Department
of Transportation (Lexington: Council of State Governments, 1976)
.
Due, John P., "Municipal Government Operation of Railway Lines", College of
Commerce Working Paper #206, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1974.
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otherwise have been. The Belfast and Moosehead Lake, in the state of Maine,
connects Belfast with the Maine Central. Built by the city but operated by the
Maine Central for many years, it resumea independent operation in 1924. Since
that time, it has been self supporting financially, and has facilitated the
growth of the poultry industry in the Belfast area in handling large shipments
of incoming grain from the midwest. The third operation, of the Municipality
of East Troy in southern Wisconsin, is an extremely small one, handling only
about 500 cars a year, but is essential for the town's major industry, a steel
tubing plant, many of whose shipments require rail service. The annual deficits
are covered by the town. A fourth, the Warrenton, in North Carolina, was not
studied in depth; it has shown a small deficit for some years - but under $1000
a year. There is one other relatively new governmental operation, that of the
Ogdensburgh Bridge and Port Authority in northern New York State. The studies
reveal the major strengths of municipal operation: the ability to support
deficits when they occur to keep the line in operation for future developments,
the advantages of partial tax exemption, and the fact that the earnings of good
years can be used to improve the line and lessen municipal taxes. There has
been no evidence whatever of lesser efficiency of operation than that of private
firms. There have been some problems, however, in finding suitable management
personnel, and, with the very small operations, the inability to have a full
time manager.
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Impact Studies
Major attention has been given to the impact of the abandonment of railway
y
lines upon the communities served. One group of these studies has been concerned
with the effects of the abandonments that had previously occurred; the other
with potential effects of abandonment with potential effects of abandonment of
particular lines now in operation. The idea of such studies is not new; the
author proposed one to a student for a master's thesis in 1947. The first serious
study, however, was that of the effects of the 1962 abandonment of the Rutland,
issued in 1966.
Below are listed the various studies:
1. C. A. Theodore and F. S. Doody, The Economic Impact of the Discontin-
uance of the Rutland Railway (Boston, Mass.: Boston University Bureau of Business
Research, 1966, mimeo)
.
2. D. Zazada, "The Probable Effects of the Application for Railway Branch
Line Abandonment on the Grain Elevator Industry," Canadian Farm Economics , vol. 3
(April 1968), pp. 20-23.
3. Simat, Helliesen and Eichner, Inc., Retrospective Rail Line Abandon-
ment Study . Final Report, revised. Report submitted to U.S. Department of
Transportation, Office of the Secretary. This unpublished study was prepared
for U. S. DOT; it compared the predictions of shippers with the actual results
of ten branch lines abandonments.
4. Benjamin J. Allen, The Economic Effects of Rail Abandonment: A Case
Study , Ph.D. Diss., University of Illinois, 1974 . This involved a study
of the overall effects of the abandonment of ten branch lines, in the east and
midwest.
5. John F. Due, "The Effects of the Abandonment of a Railway Line on
Agricultural Areas: A Case Study," Illinois Agricultural Economics , vol. 15
(July 1975), pp. 14-22. A study of the effects of abandonment of a Union Pacific
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line serving a wheat growing area in northcentral Oregon.
6
.
Bunker , Arvin R
.
, Impact of Rail Line Abandonment on Agricultural Pro-
duction and Associated Grain Marketing and Fertilizer Supply Firms , Ph.D. diss.,
Ag. Econ., Unive -sity of Illinois, 1975. A doctoral dissertation in agricultural
economics at the University of Illinois, published in a U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture report (for the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, the U.S. Senate),
Effects of the Proposed Northeast-Midwest Rail Reorganization on Rural Areas ,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). Two lines in the mid-
west were studied in depth.
7. John F. Due, Long Term Effects of Abandonment of Railway Lines (Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Commerce Working Paper #247, 1975) . This study was
concerned with the longer period effects of the abandonment of four lines (three
in Nevada, one in Oregon), that had occurred more than 30 years before the study.
8. J. Sloss, T. J. Humphrey, and F. N. Krutter, An Analysis- and Evaluation
of Past Experience in Rationalizing Railroad Networks , M.I.T. Report R74-54,
Department of Civil Engineering, M.I.T. (Cambridge, Mass.: February 1975). This
study differed from the others in that it sought, by econometric techniques, to
measure changes in economic variables in a group of 9 counties that had lost
rail service wit., an equivalent group th^t had not but was similar in other
characteristics
.
The approaches of these various studies differed somewhat, but there were
many common elements. One group was based on interviews of shippers, shipper
groups, chambers of commerce and local governments, to ascertain the
effects on transport costs, plant investment, relocation of plants and activity,
investment in roads, and community development generally.
The other approach, used to some extent in all but virtually the sole
element in some, employed statistical measures of economic growth such as
population, manufacturing output, retail sales, and other indicators, comparing
the areas losing rail services with control areas similar in other respects.
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The difficulties with both approaches are obvious. The former may not give a
clear quantitative picture and the biases of the interviewee and interviewer are
reflected in tht. results. With the latter, isolation of other influences is
virtually impossible. It is not possible to find control groups that are
identical in all respects except the retention of the rail line. As shown in
the table below, more of the affected communities lost population than gained -
but in a number of instances the decline in population had started first and
precipitated abandonment of the rail line.
The general conclusions of the overall group of studies indicate that the
actual abandonments that have occurred have not had significant effect upon the
development of the areas served, because of the availability of motor, and in
some instances, water, transport. But they have caused economic loss in some
instances to shippers whose transport costs are increased materially. The
primary adverse effects have been on some grain elevators, fertilizer and feed
dealers, and in a few instances, mining and manufacturing operations. The most
serious effect in some instances has been to close the door to any future econ-
omic development in the area requiring rail service.
The studies of projected effects are even more numerous. The following
listing is by no means complete:
1. Iowa studies. The state of Iowa probably has the highest percentage
of its rail network consisting of light density lines, many in disrepair. There
have been two major studies:
a. State of Iowa, Office of Planning and Programming, Iowa Commerce
Commission and Iowa State Highway Commission, Economic Impact of Railroad Aban-
donment in Iowa: A Case Study (Des Moines, Iowa: 1973) . This was a study of
the effects of abandonment of two lines; the loss of one would raise costs
materially, the other would have little effect.
b. C. P. Baumel, et al., An Economic Analysis of Upgrading Rail Branch
Lines (Washington: Federal Railroad Administration, 1976) . A very detailed study
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of 71 lines, in the framework of restructuring the handling of grain movements.
2. Nebraska: F. D. Gaibler and D. G. Anderson, "Economic Consequences
of Abandoning Branch-Line Railroads," Feedstuff
s
, vol. 47 (March 10,1975). A study
of the potential effects of abandonment of branch lines serving grain elevators
in a six county area of south central Nebraska.
3. Indiana: D. Rausch, L. F. Schrader, and 0. C. Doering, Evaluating
Rail Services to an Agricultural County - A Case Study in Benton County
,
Indiana , Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 71 (West
Lafayette, Indiana-- February 1975). A study of the effects of possible abandonment
of a line in Benton county, serving grain elevators.
4. The USDA survey for the Senate Committee on Agriculture: U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, for the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate,
Effects of the Proposed Northeast-Midwest Rail Reorganization on Rural Areas
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). A survey of the
effects of loss of rail lines on shippers at 100 stations on lines labelled as
potentially excess by the the DOT preliminary plan, with interview technigues.
5. South Dakota: Railroad Impact Study , Business Research Bureau, Univer-
sity of South Dakota, Vermillion, S.D., Bulletins 111, 114, 116, 1975. A study
of the potential effects of the proposed abandonment of three lines of the Chicago
and Northwestern.
These studies of projected abandonments virtually all concentrate on agri-
cultural areas; the general results are (1) that in areas such as Iowa with a
dense network of branch lines, there are substantial net gains from concentrating
the traffic on a smaller number of lines rebuilt to higher standards, although
some shippers and communities will lose; while (2) in areas having only a
sparse network and far removed from water transport, the economic costs of
abandonment are likely to be substantial. All of necessity use the interview
technique, since there are no results to measure.
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Apart from these, there have been a number of studies completed as
elements in the preparation of State Bail Plans, as required by the RRR
and RJRRR Acts
,
if the states are to be eligible for Federal subsidy funds.
This procedure involves an estimation of economic, energy, environmental,
highway, land use, and public utility relocation effects of possible aban-
donment of various light traffic lines. Economic effects are based primar-
ily on estimates by shippers as to changes in their activity if the lines
were abandoned. These are summed to provide a composite index. The various
lines are then ranked on the basis of the index, to establish priorities
for the use of Federal subsidy funds.
For example, the Wisconsin State Rail Plan (Madison: Wisconsin Department
of Transportation, 1976.)
!i
'
,
-
* i .•
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.
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Major Conclusions
These studies suggest several major conclusions:
1. There are very substantial economies of scale as traffic volume in-<
creases from very low levels, but many of these economies are exhausted by
traffic levels of 140,000 net ton miles per mile of line.
2. Class II railroads with traffic in excess of 200,000 net ton miles
per mile — roughly 27 loaded cars a day, three days a week — are economically
justifiable, even with disregard of externalities, if the main line haul is
at all significant. Costs on these lines range from 5 to 7 cents per ton
mile; those over 800,000 are as low as 2 cents per ton mile, including capital
costs figured on salvage value.
This conclusion differs sharply from the recent work of Harris and Keeler,
which, on the basis of study of Class I railroad cost functions, suggests cost
figures 2 to 3 times as high for these traffic densities.
3. Railroads with traffic under 60,000 ton miles per mile typically have
costs in excess of 30 cents a ton mile, and thus are economically justified,
without regard to externalities, only if (1) they are very short, at the most
20 miles, and (2) the line haul is substantial. The lower the traffic density,
the shorter must be the line, and the longer must be the main line haul, for the
line to be justified.
4. Despite the high costs, a number of railroads with traffic under 30,000
ton miles per mile of line have survived for long periods — but only if they
are relatively short — under 20 miles or so.
5. The economic viability of a line with traffic under 500,000 ton miles
per mile, is there fore, a function of:
a. The length of the line. There are some economies from longer
average hauls, but these are much less significant than the disadvantage of
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the relatively long high-cost haul on the longer roads.
b. The length of the main line haul.
c. The cost of transfer of freight from truck to rail.
d. The nature of the freight insofar as it affects the relative
cost and feasibility of handling by various modes.
e. The actual cost level on the line, in turn influenced by wage
levels, flexibility in the use of labor, effectiveness of management, and the
conditions affecting track maintenance costs.
The ability of a Class II railroad to cover costs is also influenced by.
the value-of-service-related influences on the rates on the commodities han-
dled, and by the rate division the road is able to obtain, when it differs
from the relative costs, but these elements are not relevant for economic
efficiency.
6. The most important externality from retention of a typical light
traffic line is to preserve for the community the possibility of attracting
rail-requiring activity in the future, plus retention of existing activity
of this type. There is also, in some instances, the importance of preser-
ving the advantage of existing rail rates that are the same from points' on
the line as those from the nearest main line rail stations. In this situation
the community can only lose from loss of the branch.
7. National externalities include energy use and pollution gains, and the
policy of aiding certain regions.
8. With typical commodities, costs, and main line haul, as a rough approx-
imation, the studies suggest the following traffic volumes as necessary for
economic justification for retention of the line, exclusive of externalities,
expressed in net ton miles per mile; 2 miles, 12,000 or 5 cars a week; 5 miles,
20,000 or 8 cars a week; 10 miles, 30,000 or 12 cars a week; 25 miles 65,000, or
21 cars; 50 miles, 200,000 or 80 cars; 100 miles, 800,000, or 320 cars. These
M-./1
..
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figures aire based on typical situations and ignore externalities. A line with
much less traffic may be warranted if the principal commodity cannot feasibly
be moved by true*; transfer costs are very high; or operating costs are unusually
low. And a community may justifiably, from its standpoint, keep a line via
subsidy even though traffic is very low, if the view is accepted that the line
is essential for future development for the community. These figures are higher
than the ICC 34-car rule but lower than DOT's recent 70 car figure at typical
distances.
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